

By DAVID INTROCASO & ADAM CUNNINGHAM
For over a decade, federal healthcare policy has operated on a foundational premise: if hospital prices are made visible, market discipline will inevitably follow. The push for price transparency—exemplified by federal disclosure rules and current legislative proposals such as the Lower Costs, More Transparency Act (H.R. 9393) and the Patients Deserve Price Tags Act (S. 2355)—aims to empower buyers and stimulate price competition. Yet, despite terabytes of disclosed price files, commercial hospital prices continue to escalate far out of proportion to underlying costs or quality improvements. The persistent failure of price transparency is not merely a problem of enforcement or compliance; it is a structural defect in market design. In highly concentrated hospital markets, publishing prices does not create market discipline because it leaves price-setting power entirely in the hands of the seller. To restrain further premium price growth, healthcare buyers or moreover ERISA plans must go beyond price transparency and restore or regain bargaining leverage.
The Illusions of Price Transparency and Internal Benchmarks
The inarguable limitation of hospital price transparency is that disclosure cannot alter the underlying power dynamics of a concentrated market. Hospitals are the price setters, plans the price takers. In approximately three out of four metropolitan statistical areas—and up to 97 percent of urban hospital markets—provider consolidation has erased competition. Commercial insurers and self-funded health plans cannot drop dominant, “must-have” hospital systems from their networks without breaching regulatory network-adequacy requirements. Knowing they cannot be excluded, consolidated health systems set prices based on bargaining leverage rather than operational cost. As a result, posting a chargemaster price or a negotiated rate publicly merely certifies what a captive buyer was forced to pay; it does not give the buyer the power to walk away.
Furthermore, recent empirical analyses demonstrate that disclosed price data remains functionally unworkable for market discipline. Hospital disclosure files are rife with noncompliance—full compliance has dropped to roughly one in five hospitals—and the posted figures lack a standardized unit of payment. Hospital contracts mix fixed dollar amounts, per diems, case rates, and percentage discounts off unlisted chargemasters, rendering the data noisy and incomparable.
When policymakers attempt to correct these market failures using internal benchmarks, the results routinely backfire:
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